Panel data is used to investigate the extent of R&D spillovers between OECD countries, and the importance of barriers to technology adoption in affecting the benefits of such spillovers. Our results indicate that countries with less regulated goods and labour markets benefit more from foreign R&D.
Introduction
have emphasised the role of vested interests and absorption barriers in limiting a country's ability to adopt technology (see also Bridgman et al., 2007) .
We examine this hypothesis by considering whether the extent of international R&D spillovers is dependent upon indicators of such barriers to technology absorption in advanced countries. Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) (CHH) identify several channels whereby foreign knowledge can be transferred including: imports of intermediate and capital goods; crossborder learning of production methods, product design and organization; imitation of new products; development of technologies and imitation of foreign technology. These arguments underlie tests of links between knowledge spillovers through trade and output or productivity growth. In a seminal paper Coe and Helpman (1995) test for trade related R&D spillovers among 22 OECD countries for [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . A stock of knowledge is constructed for each country with access measured by weighting stocks with trade flows. They conclude that both foreign and domestic stocks are important for productivity growth, with more open economies gaining most. CHH find similar results for North-South spillovers. Prescott (1999, 2003) argue that barriers to technology adoption lead to the inefficient use of inferior technologies. This argument is based on the fact that many of these barriers are assumed to be put in place to protect the interests of groups vested in current production processes. Intuitively, as long as firms are not threatened by the prospect that their competitors might introduce more productive technologies, they may prefer to stick to their current technology, although better ones are available. While barriers protecting industry insiders are likely to be considerable, labour market institutions are likely to be a further relevant barrier to technology adoption. Labour unions are another group with vested interests that may potentially oppose the introduction of possibly labour-saving technologies and could also be considered to be a group with vested interests in limiting technology adoption.
Background
In this paper we combine these two strands of literature. We examine whether the extent of international R&D spillovers through trade is influenced by indices capturing institutional characteristics of product and labor markets that may give rise to barriers to technology adoption. The following section describes the method employed.
Empirical Specification
We consider the importance of trade-related spillovers and the importance of vested interests for such spillovers between a sample of 21 OECD countries using data on five-year averages over the period 1973-1997.
The approach we adopt is similar to that of Coe and Helpman (1995) , but rather than construct a measure of TFP we choose not to impose coefficients on the share of capital and labour, allowing the data to determine the coefficients. The initial estimating equation is thus,
where ∆lny is the average growth of per capita GDP in each five year period, ∆lnk is the growth in the capital-labour ratio, S D and S F are the domestic and foreign knowledge stocks, µ i and ν t are country and time specific effects and ε the remaining error term. To account for the importance of barriers to technology adoption, we allow the coefficient associated with foreign knowledge to depend on variables representing barriers to adoption in a potentially non-linear way. In the case of a two-regime model we can write,
where B it is the index of absorption barriers, I(.) is the indicator function, taking value one if the argument is true and zero otherwise, and λ is the estimated threshold. Here the impact of foreign R&D spillovers is given by γ 2,1 for observations with λ We estimate the model using the approach advocated in Hansen (1999) , which allows us to identify the value of the threshold, λ, and the regression coefficients. The threshold parameter is estimated as the value of λ that minimises the concentrated sum of squared residuals from 
Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 1 . From the second column of Table 1 it can be seen that the results from the base specification are largely as expected.
2 The coefficient on the capital-labour ratio, α, is in line with previous estimates. The coefficient on domestic R&D, γ 1 , provides evidence on the importance of innovation-driven technological progress for a nation's growth performance. In this specification, the coefficient capturing the importance of foreign R&D, γ 2 , does not depend on potential barriers to technology adoption.
The point estimate for γ 2 is positive as expected, though not significant, a result in line with Kao et al (1999) .
The For the coordination of wage bargaining we find two significant thresholds. The results indicate that foreign R&D has a positive impact on growth in countries with low and high levels of wage coordination, but not for intermediate levels. This finding is in line with the arguments of Dowrick and Spencer (1994) who argue that unions organised at intermediate levels welcome innovation less than unions organised either at the firm or national level.
Conclusions
This paper presents results suggesting that the relationship between trade-related R&D spillovers and growth is dependent upon indices reflecting barriers to technology adoption in OECD countries. In particular, we find that the importance of foreign R&D is stronger in countries with lower levels of product market regulation and lower levels of employment protection. These results provide evidence in favour of the hypotheses proposed by Parente Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, ** and *. JB stands for the Jarque-Bera test statistic of the normal distribution of the residuals. The p-value for the likelihood ratio test of the significance of the model with threshold effects was computed using the bootstrap procedure of Hansen (1999) with 500 replications.
